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ABSTRACT. 
In terms of the history of modern economic growth the major 
axis of world confrontation has always been between early and late 
comers to industrialization. Severe confrontation arises typically 
when a late-comer country is believed to have developed a model of 
economic development capable to catch up or even surpass the 
economic power of the early-comer countries. Rises and falls of 
the various catch-up models in the modern history are examined. In 
this historical perspective the nature of confrontation is 
identified between the system of developmental market economies in 
Japan and Asian NIES and the system of liberal market economies in 
Western countries. 
JAPAN IN THE NEW WORLD CONFRONTATION: 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Along what axis of major confrontation will the world economic 
and political system be structured after the demise of the cold 
war? In terms of the history of "modern economic growth" a la 
Simon Kuznets (1966), I would predict that, as was always the case 
in the past, the new axis of confrontation will be between early 
and late comers to industrialization. To be precise, a late-comer 
country (or countries) is bound to face confrontation with the 
countries that accomplished industrialization earlier, when such a 
country is believed to have developed a model of economic growth 
capable to catching up or even surpassing the economic power of the 
early-comer countries. The communist bloc was able to establish 
the status of being one major camp in world confrontation when the 
"model of central planned economies" was hoped for and feared of 
being able to "bury capitalism." However, it lost this status when 
this model proved incapable of accomplishing the task. 
An indispensable element of any effective catch-up model is a 
mechanism of forced saving to enable accumulation of both physical 
and human capital in the late-comer country at a much faster speed 
than in the early-comer country. 1 The centrally planned economies 
have tried to achieve this goal by government's direct command on 
resource allocations. In this respect, the centrally planned 
economies that existed in this century represent a development 
model. Not all the centrally planned economies are the development 
model, however, since resource allocations with higher priority on 
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"bread and butter" than on "iron and steel" are theoretically 
possible under central planning. 
In this perspective, the demise of the cold war is nothing but 
the obvious failure of the centrally planned economies to be an 
effective model of economic development for the late-comer to catch 
up the early-comer country in industrialization. For the future 
prediction, it is critically important to understand that such a 
failure is not new, but rather has been repeated throughout the 
history of modern economic growth over two centuries. 
Defeat of "Old" Developmental Market Economies 
The first major confrontation between the early and the late 
comers in the history of modern economic growth occurred when 
Germany tried to catch up to England. England, which had 
established itself as the "workshop of the world" by the early 
nineteenth century, followed the model of "liberal market 
economies" in the tradition of Adam Smith (1776). In this model, 
ordinary economic activities should be left to decentralized 
private decisions under competition of market, while government is 
supposed to maintain law and order as a basic framework within 
which market operates. 2 Investments in human capital, such as 
education and research, were also left largely to the private 
sector. 
When Germany accomplished national unification under the 
leadership of Prince Bismarck and set forth to industrialization, 
government invested heavily in industrial infrastructure including 
technical education and applied research/development, while it 
installed tariff walls against imports of manufactured commodities 
according to Friedrich List's (1841) thesis of infant industry 
protection. This strategy was geared for accelerating capital 
accumulation and economic growth by suppressing consumption by 
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means of government finance and border protection, within the basic 
framework of market economies. As such, it was a development model 
for catching up, which may be called the model of "developmental 
market economies. " By this model, Germany was able to surpass 
England already in the 1870s in the areas of heavy and chemical 
industries. 
Germany's success attracted other late-comer countries, Tsarist 
Russia and Imperial Japan among others, to imitate the model of 
developmental market economies. It is important to note, however, 
that the United States preceded Germany in the use of this model. 
Following the advocacy of Alexander Hamilton, "the American System" 
had been established by the first half of the nineteenth century to 
protect domestic industries by tariff and to invest the tariff 
revenue in public infrastructure, such as canals and highways, for 
integrating frontiers into a single domestic market. In fact, List 
developed his idea of infant industry protection from his personal 
observation on this "American System" in the Hamilton tradition 
during his exile to the United States (List, 1827). Thus, the 
model of developmental market economies was universal in its appeal 
and applicability to the late comers in the nineteenth century. 
The problem with this model for Kaiser's Germany as well as for 
Imperial Japan was that it was tied to narrow nationalism or racism 
to promote imperialistic expansion for supporting industrial 
exports abroad. Since such ideology had no universal appeal, 
expansionist policies inevitably resulted in isolation of these 
nations in the world community. In the end, the Second and Third 
German Reichs, as well as Imperial Japan, had to experience 
disastrous defeats in the world wars. The United States was able 
to escape this route, partly because of its stronger liberalist 
tradition but, also, because of open frontiers available for 
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continued expansion in domestic market until the Spanish-American 
War. 3 
In retrospect, while this "old" model of developmental market 
economies was able to achieve success in fast economic growth and 
catch-up, it failed because its supporting ideology was 
incompatible with the world system. 
Failure of Centrally Planned Economies 
Upon the defeat of old developmental market economies, centrally 
planned economies became the forefront of development models for 
catching up. This model was not only adopted in the communist 
bloc, but also incorporated into many national development programs 
in the Third World. 
Attractiveness of this model to developing countries was, in 
part, based on ,,relatively good growth performance of the Soviet 
economy in its early stage. Resource allocation by central 
planning and command can be relatively efficient where income 
levels are low and people's wants are homogeneous so that it is not 
so difficult to estimate demand and supply of commodities. Another 
condition for effective working of centrally planned economies is 
strong ideological belief to prevent people, especially leaders, 
from free-riding and rent-seeking. Communist ideal, coupled with 
nationalism, should have served this purpose, for the periods 
during and immediately following the revolution as well as during 
the war against Nazi Germany. 
This model's attractiveness to the Third World was, also, based 
on ideological appeal of socialism for the period immediately after 
World War II. For newly independent nations, capitalism and market 
were perceived as a mechanism of colonial exploitation. Socialism 
and central planning, which were said to serve·for people's common 
well-being, were a much more attractive system. Unlike narrow 
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nationalism and racism which led pre-war Germany and Japan to 
isolation, socialist ideology was able to secure wide sympathy and 
alliance from the world for the communist bloc. 
However, centrally planned economies have a critical defect as 
a catch-up model. While resource allocations can be decently 
efficient under central planning in the low-income stage, errors in 
planning increase progressively as the level of income rises and 
people's wants diversify. Also, altruism based on communist 
ideology, which may be an effective enforcer of leaders' morals as 
well as workers' morale under the crisis situation of revolution or 
war, can not sustain for long in peace. As the income level rises 
under peace, both planning errors and rent-seeking behaviors 
accumulate to such an extent as to collapse the economy. Thus, 
centrally planned economies are bound to fail before attaining the 
catch-up goal. 
In my perspective, the communist bloc failed not because of its 
ideology but because of the critical defect on its development 
model. 4 
Prospect for "New" Developmental Marketing Economies 
The receding tide of centrally planned economies has coincided 
with the rise of a new model which may be called "new developmental 
market economies. " This is the developmental strategy that has 
been adopted by post-war Japan, followed by Asian NIES such as 
Korea and Taiwan, and later followed by ASEAN nations. 
This model is similar to the old developmental market economies 
of pre-war Germany and Japan with respect to the fact that 
government promotes high capital accumulation by suppressing 
consumption through strong regulations and administrative guidance 
within the basic framework of market economies. 5 It is different 
from the old model in the aspect that it is not tied up with narrow 
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nationalism or racism. Instead, the new model is implicitly based 
on "developmentalism" or "production fetishism" by which people 
judge whether or not certain policies are good and just in terms of 
their contributions to the growth of material output. This hidden 
ideology in the new model seems to have stemmed in Japan from deep 
disillusionment on the use of military power and sheer need for 
escape from hunger and poverty immediately after World War II, in 
addition to a century-long desire to catch up with the West. 
Effectiveness of this model in terms of its catch-up goal has 
been proved by the post-war history of East Asia. As the failure 
of centrally planned economies has become evident, attractiveness 
of new developmental market economies has increased for developing 
nations. Economic reforms in China and India in the past ten years 
appear to represent an effort to reorient their development model 
from centrally planned to developmental market economies. Also, 
recent reform in Vietnam seems to go along this line. This course 
might be followed by some East European countries, too. 
structure of New Confrontation 
My historical perspective on the rise and fall of catch-up models 
predicts the major axis of the new world system to be confrontation 
between liberal market economies in North America and Western 
Europe and new developmental market economies in East Asia and its 
followers. Compared with this major axis, other confrontations 
even including the recent Gulf War are not really global but rather 
local by nature, however severe and violent they may be, since 
countries like Iraq have accidentally become rich enough to build 
military power sufficient for seeking regional hegemony, but have 
not developed an effective system of sustaining economic devel­
opment with which they can challenge for world-wide hegemony. 
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Unlike the confrontation between liberal market and centrally 
planned economies, the new confrontation is not ideological but is 
limited to conflicts in economic interests. Yet, there is a danger 
that this confrontation will escalate beyond the economic sphere. 
As developmental market economies become successful in industrial 
development, they begin to compete in the world trade of 
manufactured commodities. If this speed is too fast and exceeds 
the capacity of industrial adjustment on the side of advanced 
economies, it tends to create strong political demand for 
protectionism within advanced countries. The real danger arises 
when the protectionist bloc tries to achieve its political goal by 
escalating economic conflicts to ideological confrontation. Their 
common strategy is to condemn advancement of developmental market 
economies to the world market as based on "unfair" production and 
trade practices, and to conclude these "unfair" practices as based 
on different culture and ideology from Western democracy and 
liberalism. On this ground, they argue that, since there is no 
common ground for settlement through rational dialogue, these 
economies must be "contained" by force. This is typical of the 
arguments against "the Japanese System" of so-called "revisionists" 
represented by James Fallows (1989), Chalmers Johnson (1982), Clyde 
V. Prestowitz, Jr. (1988) and Karel van Wolfaren (1989) . 6 
If such a political maneuver to escalate the economic problem to 
the ideological confrontation is successful, it will result in 
popular criticism from the side of advanced economies on the 
social/cultural systems of developmental market economies. 
Resulting external pressures for reforms in these systems will 
evoke reactional nationalism on the other side. If developmental 
market economies may thus be pushed too hard, they may revert their 
route to that followed by pre-war Germany and Japan. On the other 
hand, if developmental market economies shall be allowed to grow 
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smoothly, their political systems which are now somewhat despotic 
and totalitarian are likely to move toward democracy and 
liberalism; this tendency is evident from the recent moves in Korea 
and Taiwan. 
Beyond Developmental Market Economies 
It will add another major example to the stupidity of the human 
race if advanced countries will chase out newly emerging nations 
from the new to the old model of developmental market economies. 
We must remember how Weimar democracy in Germany and Taisho 
democracy in Japan were massacred by economic blockism following 
the World .oepressi;on. Unless such stupidity shall be prevented 
from recurring, the new world system will suffer the same fear and 
waste as experienced under the cold war. 
How can the new confrontation between liberal and developmental 
market economies be structured so as to be constructive rather than 
destructive? In order to prevent the confrontation from turning 
into a negative-sum game, both sides must be freed from mutual fear 
and distrust. For that purpose, clear understanding must be 
established that liberal and developmental market economies are not 
really discontinuous. It must be recognized that, while the 
present system of Japan and Asian NIES might be unique, it may not 
be quite so unique relative to "the American System" or "the German 
System" in the nineteenth century. 
Since the system of developmental market economies is a catch-up 
model, its positive role should end when the zeal of late-comer 
countries for catching up to advanced will be satisfied. If a 
country would wish to further promote the economic welfare of its 
people in a stage beyond the successful catch-up, the country must 
transform itself from developmental to liberal market economies, 
because the system which can best serve for consumers' (citizens') 
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welfare at a high income stage characterized by increased 
variations in people's wants is nothing but the free market 
mechanism based on competition under transparent rules. 
The best proof for continuity to exist between liberal and 
developmental market economies will be Japan's transformation. 
Japan was a forerunner of new developmental market economies and 
was successful in achieving the catch-up goal almost two decades 
ago. Yet, its transformation into liberal market economies has 
long been overdue. As the result, the nation is now suffering from 
serious international economic frictions as well as a large gap 
between GNP and the quality of life. Japan must be quick to 
abandon the government regulations and administrative guidance that 
are against the principle of consumer sovereignty, and thereby to 
establish the free market system that is transparent to all 
citizens and open to the world. 
This shift does not mean abandonment of Japan's cultural 
identity. The prevailing government controls andregulations were 
not necessarily rooted in the unique culture of Japan but were 
mostly created in the relatively recent past as a device of 
catching up. Somewhat unique business organizations and trade 
practices do exist that may appear to be strongly group-oriented 
and non-individualistic to the eyes of westerners. However, real 
monopoly and inefficiency tend to arise where these group-oriented 
organizations are reinforced by government controls. Once those 
controls shall be removed, some of the apparently unique 
organizations and practices in Japan will disappear as they will 
lose to competition in the free market if they are inconsistent 
with the interests of consumers. Those institutions that may 
survive through market competition, even if they might be 
originated in Japan's unique culture, will have universal 
applicability and contribute to revitalization of the world 
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economy. 7 It must be recognized that the vitality of liberal 
market economies, too, can not be maintained unless they continue 
efforts for institutional and organizational innovations, sometimes 
by learning from other cultures' innovations, in response to 
changes in technology and people's preference. 
Already it is late but it may not be too late for Japan to prove 
by itself that, upon successful catch-up, developmental market 
economies shift to liberal market economies. If Japan accomplishes 
this task, fear and suspicion of advanced industrial countries 
against late-comer countries based on the system of developmental 
market economies may be reduced. Also, bold opening of the 
Japanese market would increase confidence and reliance of 
developmental market economies on Japan. On the basis of increased 
confidence and trust from the world, Japan should act as a bona 
fide moderator between liberal and developmental market economies 
so that their relation will turn out to be a positive-sum game. 
If the world system instead falls into a negative-sum game, the 
basis of Japan's prosperity will inevitably be lost. Public 
awareness of this danger has not yet been sufficiently strong so as 
to overcome the resistance of vested interest groups to the swift 
shift to liberal market economies. Indeed, the system of 
developmental market economies, which proved to be extremely 
successful for Japan in the past, has now been turning into its 
fatal stumbling block. 
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NOTES 
1. Of course, another requirement is the society's ability to 
allocate the saving efficiently among alternative investment 
opportunities so as to maximize the long-term growth rates of 
national product. 
2. In the course of history this model has undergone major 
modifications in North America and Western Europe including 
England itself under the tides of social democracy and 
Keynesianism. Yet, the model of liberal market economies 
based on the principles of equal opportunities, free 
competition and consumer sovereignty has survived as an ideal 
to bind economic policies in the western countries. 
3. Moreover, it would not be an unfair statement that the model 
of liberal market economies in early-comer countries such as 
England and France was supported by the vast market in their 
overseas colonies. 
4. Several other catch-up models also failed before they became 
major contenders to world economic hegemony. For example, the 
"Latin American model" as represented by Peronism, which is . 
considered a marriage of populism with the model of 
development market economies, failed because producers' excess 
profits due to such policies as import-substitution 
industrialization were dissipated for consumption. 
5. The structure and the working mechanism of this system have 
been described from various angles, including Johnson (1982), 
Yamamura and Yasuba (1987), Prestowitz (1988), Okimoto (1989), 
and Yamamura (1990). An interesting general characterization 
of postwar economic policies in Japan is advanced in Yasusuke 
Murakami's article (Yamamura and Yasuba, 1987, pp. 33-90). 
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6. For a succinct restatement of their position, see Fallows, 
Johnson, Prestowitz and van Wolfaren (1990). For a critical 
review of revisionists' arguments and counter arguments, see 
Yamamura (1990, pp. 13-64). 
7. For the nature and significance of intra- and inter-firm 
organizations in Japan, see Abegglen and Stalk (1985), Aoki 
(1984a, 1984b, 1988), Imai, Itami and Koike (1982), and Imai 
and Komiya (1989). Thomas c. Smith (1988) provides a useful 
perspective on how the unique industrial organization of Japan 
had stemmed from the organization of premodern agrarian 
society. 
